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MARY J. DA VIS* 
Toward the Proper Role for Mass 
Tort Class Actions 
I t is currently unfashionable to defend the class action for resolving mass tort litigation.} Recent heated debate over two 
enormous asbestos settlement class actions2 and the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in one of those actions, Amchem Prod-
ucts Inc. v. Windsor? exploring the appropriateness of the settle-
ment class, have placed the continuing validity of the mass tort 
class action in serious doubt. Many academics,4 as well as federal 
* Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. 
J.D. 1985, Wake Forest University School of Law; B.A. 1979, University of Virginia. 
Thanks to the faculty of the College of William and Mary for their comments on this 
Article when presented at a colloquium in November 1997. I am grateful as always 
for the summer research grant support of the University of Kentucky College of 
Law. 
I For purposes of this Article, mass tort litigation refers to those circumstances 
where a product, not an accident, has caused geographically and temporally wide-
spread harm to consumers of the product, and possibly bystanders as well. In such 
cases, there is very likely more than one potentially responsible party if only because 
more than one product manufacturer typically will exist. The paradigm mass tort is, 
of course, asbestos personal injury, but most mass torts do not have such a long life 
nor such a large number of putatively responsible parties. The Dalkon Shield in-
trauterine device is another prime example. Thousands of women were injured 
from use of the Dalkon Shield which was manufactured by only one company, A.H. 
Robins. For a thorough discussion of the nature of mass tort litigation, see Deborah 
R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: 
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993). 
2 Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (affirming reversal of 
certification to settlement class of millions of future injury asbestos claimants against 
consortium of 20 former asbestos manufacturers); In re Asbestos Litigation, 101 
F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503, affd 
on remand, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (settlement class of thousands of asbestos 
present and future injury claimants certified against one defendant, Fibreboard 
Corp.). 
3117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (settlement nature of class action relevant in certification 
decision under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3». 
4 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (criticizing mass tort settlement classes and 
suggesting bankruptcy is a better solution to large numbers of mass tort claimants); 
[157] 
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court of appeals judges,S have also pronounced the death knell 
for the mass tort class action.6 
This Article seeks to advance the use of mass tort class actions 
and proposes that they are not only appropriate, but desirable, 
when evaluated against the backdrop of substantive tort law poli-
cies. Moreover, the substantive goals of tort law as applied in the 
mass tort context support the conclusion that the individualized 
case-by-case adjudication standard, as applied through our ad-
versary system as it is presently constituted, fails to further the 
search for fairness as well as truth in the mass tort context, and 
therefore, does not achieve the fairness or justice that we seek 
through our judicial process.7 
Tort law serves as a method for society to impose responsibility 
upon those who have created certain socially undesirable harms 
as defined by considering a complex combination of underlying 
Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 
295 (1996) (recommending administrative solution to mass tort claims). See gener-
ally Symposium, The Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on 
Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just 
Desserts, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811 (1995). For a defense lawyer's perspective, see 
Eric Watt Wiechmann et aI., Mass Tort Class Actions: Is the Tide Turning?, 64 DEF. 
COUNSEL J. 67 (1997); and for the plaintiff's viewpoint, see Ronald L. Motley and 
Susan Nial, A Critical Analysis of the Brickman Administrative Proposal: Who De-
clared War on Asbestos Victims' Rights?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1919 (1992). 
5 For a detailed discussion of the important recent appellate opinions decertifying 
class actions, see infra notes 153-232 and accompanying text. The most stunning 
example of a federal appellate judge's disbelief in the usefulness of a mass tort class 
action is found in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Posner, J.), discussed infra notes 160-82 and accompanying text. 
6 Defenders of class actions are likely to be described as enemies of the integrity 
of the judicial system, as well as either prejudicially plaintiff or defense oriented, 
depending on the critic's particular point of view. An example of the contentious-
ness of the debate about mass tort class actions can be found in Georgine v. 
Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d at 618. 
7 For a discussion of the view that the adversary system may no longer be the best 
method for resolving disputes in our society, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). Professor Menkel-Meadow, and others, continue to suggest 
that because of the illusive nature of truth, and the complex nature of our society as 
well as the disputes it gives rise to, the adversary system "is inadequate, indeed dan-
gerous, for satisfying a number of important goals of any legal or dispute resolution 
system. . .. Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the best 
way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, leaves out impor-
tant information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies." Id. at 
6 (footnotes omitted). Professor Menkel-Meadow uses mass tort class actions as an 
example of the complexity of modern life's problems with which the adversary sys-
tem may be inadequate to deal. Id. at 10. See also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). 
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goals. Most observers of the tort system generally regard the un-
derlying principle bases of tort responsibility rules to be the dual 
notions of fairness and efficiency.s Just as tort rules of responsi-
bility consider these two primary, but not exclusive, viewpoints, 
the process by which liability is determined should permit a bal-
anced presentation of the viewpoints which inform that liability 
determination, including an accurate reflection of the magnitude 
of the harm and the extent of the potential liability. By prohibit-
ing the use of the class action to resolve multi-faceted, complex 
mass tort litigation, and thereby requiring individualized resolu-
tion of such claims, the recent decisions denying mass tort class 
action treatment fail to promote the full array of underlying goals 
of tort law. Further, those decisions contribute to the perception 
of a judicial system that is unresponsive to basic societal goals, a 
system that is thereby irretrievably prejudiced in favor of an irre-
sponsible institutional defendant over the victim of irresponsibil-
ity. If viewed through the backdrop of tort responsibility 
theories, the mass tort class action is, in fact, a balanced approach 
to determining responsibility for such widely caused harm. 
The guiding principle of this Article's thesis is that the judici-
ary, as well as other opponents of the mass tort class action, has 
an unnecessarily "proceduralist" perspective on the class action 
tool, with an inordinate fear of the "mass" side of the equation. 
That fear stems from the proceduralist's concern with the tradi-
tional right to individualized, case-by-case adjudication and the 
judicial system's perceived need to maintain and insure its integ-
rity only through that traditional adversary system.9 This Article 
8 For a thorough description of the goals of products liability in particular see 
Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 
WAYNE L. REV. 1217 (1993). See also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of 
Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 
(1993); see generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (proposing theory of liability based on reciprocity of 
risk); Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's 
Neighbors,77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (exploring corrective justice theory as ap-
plied to tort goals); ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (4th ed. 1995) 
(compilation of articles on foundation of tort law). 
9 For a thorough discussion of the proceduralist's viewpoint regarding class ac-
tions and other complex litigation generally, see Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to 
"Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1991) (discussing the move 
toward collective treatment of cases, and away from the individual case-by-case ad-
judication model on which our judicial system is founded). For a more general view 
of the class action in relation to the individual versus collective adjudication model, 
see Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 21, 25 (1996) (defining the central normative tension in the class action as 
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proposes that the proper definition of the mass tort class action 
requires a greater focus on the "tort" side of the "mass tort" 
equation. lO The proceduralist view is concerned with the generic 
effect of a particular procedure on the fairness and efficiency of 
the judicial system, not with its effect on the underlying substan-
tive rule in issueY Torts theorists, on the other hand, focus on 
the effect of application of the rule in issue on behavioral, cul-
tural, political, societal, and other goals on which the rule is 
founded. 12 At bottom, the procedure enables the substance; it 
gives purpose and promise to the goals the substance seeks to 
accomplish. To enable the goals of the tort responsibility rules to 
operate in the context of the mass produced harms of the Twenti-
eth and Twenty-First Centuries, the class action, or some reform 
of the adversary system as it is currently constituted,13 must be 
available. 
A number of preliminary conclusions stem from this tort per-
spective and will provide a framework for the remainder of this 
Article. First, from a torts perspective, certification of a mass 
tort class action should not be an all or nothing proposition. Re-
cent mass tort class action decertification opinions speak categor-
stemming from the principle that each person should have a day in court). See gen· 
erally Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1523 (1995) (dis· 
cussing proposals to aggregate mass tort claims and to amend the multidistrict 
litigation statute to permit discovery coordination of large-scale litigation without 
compromising individual litigants' rights); William W. Schwarzer et aI., Judicial Fed· 
eralism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery 
Coordination of Large·Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1529, 1529-31 (1995) (different categories of litigation create different kinds 
of problems but aggregation can compromise litigants' rights to individualized reso-
lution of claims). 
10 Only a very few articles have discussed the class action method from a "sub-
stance" point of view. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? 
Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995) (discussing a perceived 
tort reform effect of class actions); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collec-
tivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996) 
(discussing aggregation methods as means of promoting substantive tort law goals of 
deterrence and compensation). 
11 See FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (rules designed to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determinations). On the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules, see Weber, 
The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A Comment 
on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. 
LITIG. 113,120 (1994). 
12 For a discussion of torts scholarship and its relevance to how the world works, 
see Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us 
About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567 (1995). 
13 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 31. 
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ically on this point, suggesting that the mass tort class action is 
virtually an impossibility.14 Second, the class action device must 
be viewed contextually to determine its proper scope in the mass 
tort context. In other words, the context of the particular type of 
mass tort litigation involved must be given central focus to deter-
mine whether the class action can be usefully employed-useful 
to effectuate the goals of both the judicial system and the organic 
tort laws which that system exists to enforce. Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs federal class ac-
tions,15 is indeed written with the underlying case context in 
mind, but it has not been so applied. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the individualized adjudication model, so well-suited to 
the pre-technology age, must be allowed to leave center stage in 
the post-technology age, and acceptance of alternative remedies 
like the class action must be allowed to take it. In our post-tech-
nology society, with the total absence of a one-to-one, individual-
ized connection between the consumer and the institutional 
product liability defendant,16 it is unrealistic to expect that the 
determination of responsibility for mass product-related harm 
will be left in perpetuity to that pre-1940's individualized litiga-
tion model.17 
Several sweeping recent United States court of appeals deci-
sions, and volumes of academic scholarship, make it necessary to 
emphasize not only the appropriateness, but the attractiveness of 
the class action alternative for mass torts. In those decisions, 
among them the asbestos settlement class cases of In re Asbestos 
Litigation,18 Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. ,19 the HIV-in-
14 For a discussion of these federal appellate cases, see infra notes 153-232 and 
accompanying text. 
15 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23. The details of Federal Rule 23's requirements, which 
are widely followed in state court practice as well, are left to Part III of this Article. 
For the view that state court is the better forum for resolving mass tort litigation, see 
Marc C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitwional and Practi-
cal Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994). 
16 Because there are a variety of product liability defendants, I use the term "insti-
tutional defendant" to incorporate all such entities. The vast majority of products 
liability defendants are manufacturers, and so, too, the class action defendant. But it 
is possible that other categories of defendants will be involved, such as distributors, 
marketers, and retailers. 
17 For a brief explanation of the connection between use of the class action and 
the political ideology of the 1960s, see Fiss, supra note 9, at 30-31. 
18 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 
2503 (1997), affd on remand, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998). The court of appeals 
upheld certification of a class action in the settlement of thousands of asbestos 
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fected blood litigation in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. ,20 and 
the nationwide tobacco class action in Castano v. American To-
bacco CO.,21 the class action method of resolving mass toxic tort 
claims was rejected as a means of dealing with the onslaught of 
mass tort litigation.22 Given the experience of our mass produc-
tion, post-technology society, mass tort litigation is to be antici-
pated for years to come. While many reasons may exist to reject 
the class action for certain categories of mass torts,23 the two pri-
mary reasons relied upon in these cases-the judicial system's 
claims against Fibreboard Corp., one of the few remaining solvent major players in 
the asbestos litigation saga. 
19 Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (decertifying a settlement 
class of 250,000 to 2,000,000 asbestos future injury plaintiffs against a group of 20 
defendants). Georgine and In re Asbestos Litigation serve as bookends in the settle-
ment class debate since the Third Circuit rejected such a class and the Fifth Circuit 
upheld it. The Supreme Court's definitive treatment of the availability of settlement 
classes, while not central to this article, will be discussed infra notes 143-152 and 
accompanying text. 
In addition, for a number of reasons to be explained infra relating to the contex-
tual nature of mass tort class actions, asbestos litigation must be treated separately 
from other mass tort class actions in evaluating the propriety of that aggregation 
method of resolving such claims. The asbestos litigation carries so much baggage 
that it is impossible for the players to be objective in any meaningful sense in resolv-
ing that litigation, through settlement or otherwise, and the class action may indeed 
be inappropriate for its resolution. See, e.g, Coffee, supra note 4. Consequently, 
battles fought and lessons learned from the asbestos litigation may well prove too 
much in other contexts. 
20 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
21 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Because the activity in the tobacco litigation seems 
to take place at such a fevered pace, at least since Castano was decertified and doz-
ens of state-wide class actions have taken its place, a full explanation of the current 
events in that litigation will not be attempted. Suffice it to say that a settlement has 
been negotiated between the states suing for Medicaid expense reimbursements and 
both the states of Mississippi and Florida have settled their actions for approxi-
mately $3 and $11 billion respectively. The settlement, which may become federal 
legislation, will be discussed in Congress throughout the coming year; the tobacco 
companies primarily seek immunity from class actions and punitive damages. For a 
discussion of the legal issues in the tobacco controversy, see Symposium, Tobacco: 
The Growing Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 397 (1997) (articles by Ausness, LeBel, 
Wertheimer, and others). 
22 Also important in this area are In re American Medical Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 
(6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a class of approximately 10,000 to 20,000 penile prosthe-
sis plaintiffs), and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank, 55 F.3d 768 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. French, 116 S.Ct. 88 (1995) 
(decertifying a settlement class of over 500,000 GM truck owners, none involving 
personal injury). 
23 For a discussion of the criticisms of mass tort class action certification, see infra 
Part IV. See generally Coffee, supra note 4, at 1363-67. 
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inability to handle such actions with integrity,24 and the financial 
welfare of the institutional defendant tortfeasors25-provide a 
wholely insufficient basis to do so, particularly in light of the un-
derlying tort goals.26 In spite of the documented tragedy of 
mass-produced harms, the traditional one-on-one individualized 
adjudication model, which generally insulates the institutional 
defendants from shouldering the full extent of their responsibil-
ity, remains embedded in the psyche of this country's legal 
academy.27 
This Article proposes that there exists a category of mass torts 
for which class action treatment is both appropriate and impera-
tive: those involving widespread personal injury, currently mani-
fested or reasonably certain to occur, caused by a discrete, 
though not necessarily a small, number of potentially culpable 
defendants whose allegedly tortious behavior was/is widely di-
rected to the consuming public. An important component of this 
definition, a relatively discrete group of defendants, leads to the 
conclusion that asbestos litigation, the single most complex mass 
tort litigation to date, must be singled out for resolution, and 
likely is, in most respects, inappropriate for class action treat-
ment. The contentious debate between proponents and oppo-
nents of the recent asbestos settlement classes in Amchem 
Products Inc. v. Windsor and in In re Asbestos Litigation, pro-
vides significant support for the idea that asbestos litigation is in 
need of a true alternative resolution process.28 
24 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 618. 
25 See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1300. 
26 On the inability of the judicial system to handle advances in technology which 
lead to mass consumer harms with which this article is concerned, see Nagareda, 
supra note 4, at 296-300 (mass torts illustrate effort to handle unanticipated conse-
quences of modern technology, suggesting administrative procedures to resolve such 
claims); John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 990, 1012 (1995) (our ability to harness technology tests capacity of the legal 
system); and Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: 
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845,907 (1987) (reaping benefits 
of technology creates mass torts which require redress by system ill-equipped to 
handle it). 
27 On the topic generally of a culture of irresponsibility that has been promoted 
over the last decades in favor of irresponsible defendants, see Mary J. Davis, The 
Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075 
(1996). 
28 Chief Justice Rehnquist created the judicial Conference's Ad Hoc Committee 
on Asbestos Litigation in 1990 to explore this very issue. That Committee's report in 
1991 proposed a national asbestos dispute resolution scheme based on consolidation 
in a single forum. See Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, in Reports of the 
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Separating asbestos litigation from the rest of the mass tort 
world, however, does not require the further conclusion that 
class actions are inappropriate for other mass torts. The criticism 
of mass tort class actions based on their inappropriateness for 
resolving asbestos litigation proves too much. Asbestos litigation 
should be seen as only a subclass of mass tort litigation and not 
given any greater weight in the class action analysis than is due. 
Indeed, this Article's thesis that a contextual analysis better 
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 33 (March 1991). This 
report plays a prominent role in the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in 
Amchem Products. See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2237-38 
(1997). Indeed, the United States Congress has been debating how or whether to 
legislate regarding the asbestos litigation crisis since the 1980s. See, e.g., Occupa-
tional Diseases and Their Compensation, Part 1: Asbestosis-Related Diseases, hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 96th Congo (1979) (hearings focused on HR 2740, the Asbes-
tos Heaith hazards Compensation Act); Proposed Asbestos Claims Facility, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 99th Congo (1985) (hearing to discuss proposal to establish a claims facility 
for compensation of victims of asbestos-related occupational diseases); Asbestos Lit-
igation Crisis in Federal and State Courts, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellec-
tual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
102nd Congo (1991-92) (hearings to discuss asbestos litigation crisis in federal and 
state courts); The Problems in Asbestos Litigation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd 
Congo (1992) (hearing regarding the problems in asbestos litigation); see generally 
Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos 
Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991) (exploring the procedures 
used in two asbestos class actions). 
That many judges suggest that mass torts, particularly asbestos, can only be dealt 
with through legislative enactment does not mask the fact that Congress has not 
acted, and likely will not. As well, asbestos litigation participants, plaintiffs, defend-
ants, and their lawyers appear not to be objective about the methods of resolving 
that litigation. On this point, see the very different accounts of the settlement by the 
majority and dissenting opinions in In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 
1996). Professor Coffee, who testified on behalf of the objectors to the Amchem 
Products class action asbestos settlement, has thoroughly explored the asbestos liti-
gation and its inappropriateness for settlement class action treatment. Coffee, supra 
note 4, at 1384-1404. Professor Coffee explores the relationship of the actors in the 
asbestos litigation and the arguably "collusive" settlement they reached of all future 
claims against the main non-bankrupt defendants left fighting the litigation. Profes-
sor Coffee chronicles the way in which plaintiffs' counsel came to be involved in 
settlement negotiations in Amchem Products, through apparent selection by defense 
counsel, and he explores the details of the settlement, an over-lOO page document. 
The settlement included a relatively large settlement of the plaintiffs' lawyers "in-
ventory" of present injury claims compared to the smaller settlement of similar 
claims of the represented future claimants. One is left to speculate on the relation-
ship between the two results, hence the suspected "collusive" nature of the settle-
ment process. Id. at 1394-97. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's resolution of 
Amchem Products, see infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text. 
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serves both proceduralist and tort policy concerns requires the 
conclusion that asbestos litigation is inappropriate for class ac-
tion treatment. Any discussion of class actions and mass torts 
must be engaged in without focus exclusively, or even primarily, 
on asbestos litigation. 
The definition of mass torts appropriate for class action treat-
ment thus includes those non-asbestos mass torts whose large 
claimant pool and discrete number of potentially culpable parties 
are brought together as the result of conduct confined to a de-
fined time period in which the defendants engaged in behavior 
that presented virtually identical risk to all the claimants. The 
mass torts involving silicone gel breast implants and many other 
medical devices, tobacco (on a possibly more limited scale), and 
HIV-infected blood products will be included in this group. The 
relationship between the institutional defendants and the injured 
claimants is a distant and impersonal one, involving only the inju-
rious use of a defective product, possibly related to misrepresen-
tations in marketing schemes directed to entice the public at 
large. Consequently, no meaningful difference based on the na-
ture of the parties' relationship exists on which to base liability as 
might be the case in other contexts, like medical malpractice or 
automobile accident cases. These mass tort cases, therefore, can 
be litigated using the class action because the crucial aspect of 
the cases is identical across the claimant spectrum: culpability.29 
Whether culpability exists, in the sense of a breach of duty or 
strict liability, product defectiveness is not claimant-dependent 
but rather is driven by the conduct of the defendants and is based 
on the very limited range of bases of tort responsibility. The in-
stitutional actors involved acted culpably or not with regard to 
the entire class of the consuming public since these mass torts 
involve mass marketing of allegedly defective products, and thus 
responsibility can and should be determined in the context of the 
collective harm. 
29 One of the criticisms of the use of the class action is that more than one state's 
law may be applicable, thus preventing the commonality of issues required by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As will be discussed in detail infra at notes 281-97 
and accompanying text, this purported problem is, at most, a red herring that de-
volves into an argument that individualized adjudication is the only proper model 
for resolving this litigation. While recognizing that many different tort bases of lia-
bility exist for one course of conduct-negligence, strict liability and others-the 
underlying nature of the relationship between the institutional defendants and the 
mass tort claimants is the same and should be the central focus of the resolution of 
responsibility. 
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting 
class actions, forms the basis for this Article's analysis of the 
mass tort class action.30 This Article focuses on litigation and not 
settlement classes because tort responsibility rules are likely to 
be fully evaluated in public litigation and not through private set-
tlement. Even though a significant number of civil actions are 
settled,31 situations often exist where settlement only comes after 
determinations by the judicial system of responsibility-the as-
bestos and Dalkon Shield litigation history speaks loudly on this 
point. The resolution of liability by virtue of the limited issue 
class,32 as attempted in Castano v. The American Tobacco Com-
pany33 and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. ,34 is, therefore, an 
important component of effectuating tort responsibility values. 
Defendants often fear litigation class actions precisely because 
the extent of the harm caused by the allegedly tortious conduct is 
so gre.at. When one institutional defendant is opposed by one 
individual claimant, the extent of the defendant's failed responsi-
bility can be masked in many ways-behind the victim's own 
contributory fault or lack of causation or the fact-quagmire of 
30 This Article focuses on the class action permitted by FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3), 
the so-called common issues class which permits class certification when common 
questions of law or fact predominate over the individual issues and the class action is 
a superior method of adjudication of those issues. Rule 23(b )(3) is, further, a volun-
tary, opt-out class which permits any plaintiff who wishes to avoid involvement in 
the class. This type of class is the most frequently sought in mass tort cases. Rule 
23(b )(1) permits mandatory certification in cases where the pursuit of separate ac-
tions risks inconsistent adjudications establishing varying standards of conduct by 
the defendants, or where those adjudications might be dispositive of the interests of 
others. The class in In re Asbestos Litigation was a Rule 23(b )(1) class, also known 
as a limited fund class. 90 F.3d at 982-83. Rule 23(b)(2) permits mandatory certifi-
cation in cases where equitable relief is sought. Rule 23(b )(2) was used to attempt 
certification of the punitive damages issue in the Dalkon Shield litigation in the early 
1980s, and was rejected. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield Etc., 693 
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). 
31 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 
1093, 1100 n.17 (1996). A recent study of class actions in federal courts, a study 
commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center, found that settlement and trial rates 
for the class actions studied in four federal districts were consistent with a general 
trend toward fewer trials and more settlements in civil litigation in federal district 
courts. There was not a higher rate of settlement in the class actions certified than in 
civil actions not certified. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVI· 
SORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 90 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) [hereinafter 
EMPIRICAL STUDY]. 
32 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(4) (providing for a limited issue class). 
3384 F.3d. 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
34 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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proximate cause. When an entire industry is opposed by substan-
tially all those harmed by the defendants' failure of responsibil-
ity, that industry cannot so easily hide its irresponsibility behind 
individual causation and defenses that shift the focus from the 
defendants' irresponsibility. Defendants might be expected to 
staunchly oppose class actions on liability-the individualized ad-
judication model provides them with as many chances to escape 
responsibility as there are victims. 
This Article proceeds, then, to advance the use of the litigation 
class action. Part I describes the goals of the device and provides 
a historical background on the use and underuse of class actions 
in mass torts cases. Then, Part II explores the recent court of 
appeals and trial court cases dealing with class certification in 
mass tort cases and identifies the rationales given for those hold-
ings, both for and against certification, though most of those 
cases are against certification. Part III responds to the criticisms 
of mass tort class actions and identifies and explains the impor-
tant reasons that support class action certification in the mass 
tort context. This Part argues that the appropriate use of the 
mass tort class action is consistent both with the goals of judicial 
system integrity and fairness to litigants-goals so often identi-
fied as reasons to deny class action certification. Part IV explains 
why the goals of tort law can be effectively pursued in mass tort 
cases through'judicial aggregation methods like the class action?5 
Further, in response to the proceduralists concern about judicial 
integrity, Part V explores some basic tenets of the concept of ju-
dicial integrity and concludes that any loss of judicial integrity 
resulting from mass tort class actions comes not from the use of 
the class action method, but rather, from the unreasonable and 
unnecessary rejection of the class action method resulting from 
an overly aggressive commitment to the individualized litigation 
model. Part V proposes the increased use of the limited issue 
35 This Article assumes that the judiciary is the appropriate final arbiter of the 
legal claims presented in the mass tort context and must assume responsibility to 
solve its problems, While others have advocated congressional intervention, Con-
gress cannot be expected to act in this area, as is evident from its failure to act in the 
asbestos context as described supra in note 28, The bankruptcy system, while an 
alternative, is not, as some have argued, a realistic, efficient or appropriate venue for 
the resolution of the thousands of tort claims institutional defendants cause. See 
Coffee, supra note 4, at 1457-1461 (arguing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion as superior method of adjudicating mass tort claims than class action). While 
some bankruptcies have handled personal injury claims well, others clearly have not. 
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class action as a way to balance the substantive tort and proce-
dural integrity concerns. 
I 
THE HISTORY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN MASS 
TORT LITIGATION 
To understand the current state of the use of the class action 
and appreciate why those engaged in the debate over its use in 
the mass tort context are so polarized, the goals of the class ac-
tion must be explored. The appellate judiciary has, for the most 
part, appeared unwilling to consider the class action a tool of 
both substantive and procedural goals, and has instead focused 
on the class action's usefulness in resolving daunting caseload 
management problems.36 The efficiency goals are, however, only 
a part of the device's historical purpose.37 
A. The Historical Goals of the Class Action Procedure 
The class action rule is an invention of equity,38 created in 
English courts of chancery as a matter of convenience to afford 
relief to parties before the court in spite of their inability to com-
ply with then-compulsory joinder rules.39 In its more modern 
form, the class action has been described, in addition, as a means 
of "protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the 
protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a conve-
36 When asked to identify the early signs of a litigation crisis in the asbestos litiga-
tion, Professor Deborah Hensler of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice said to the 
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate: 
As we increasingly deal with cases that arrive in this fashion of tens of 
thousands of cases with difficult questions involving causation, I think the 
courts need to be responsive in trying to come up with innovative proce-
dures for dealing with those. In my judgment, in the early 1980's when 
some of the trial judges who were most familiar with those cases tried to 
come up with innovations, they met a fair amount of resistance from the 
appellate courts, and I think looking back with hindsight, we can say per-
haps we should have been a little faster to recognize that these were a 
different kind of case. 
The Problems in Asbestos Litigation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Congo 6 
(1992) (testimony of Deborah R. Hensler). 
37 For a discussion of the challenges aggregation models generally pose to the ad-
judicatory process, see Resnik, supra note 9, at 5. 
38 1 HERBERT NEWBERG AND ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 1.02, at 1-6 (3d ed. 1992) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940» [here-
after NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS]' See also id., § 1.06, at 1-17. 
391d. § 1.06, at 1-17. 
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